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11.4 Two objections generate, create none none for none print code 128 difficult, if not none none impossible. If they are right about this, I do not think that the consequence is the utter collapse of the audacia/ira distinction. Rather, the distinction would apply to the human case, even as it is questionable in the case of non-rational animals.

However this may be, it is clear for Aquinas that reason plays a decisive role in the causation of anger in human beings. It is equally clear that the role played by reason does not make it any less of a passion. It may be right to attribute to God and the angels (and perhaps to human beings in some cases) a pseudopassion corresponding to anger that involves judgment and an act of will, but with no corresponding motion of the sensitive appetite (see 2.

2). But anger itself, as ordinarily experienced, involves an identifiable set of characteristic somatic events. As such, it qualifies as a passion in the strict sense.

To that passion I now turn.. Windows Forms chapter 12 Anger Aquinas begins the consideration of anger by asking what makes it a passion. Understanding the precise nature of anger as a passion is crucial, lest it be confused with the sin that bears the same name. Aquinas asks why anger is a specific passion, rather than the general act of the irascible (as its name might suggest), and isolates the formal object of anger ( 12.

1). In the course of treating anger itself, Aquinas positively connects anger to reason, nature, and justice. Though anger may distort our perception of what is required by each of these things, its primal connection to these things is divinely intended and, as such, good.

Or so Aquinas holds in what, I argue, amounts to a qualified defense of the passion of anger ( 12.2). What causes anger Aquinas addresses this question by identifying and explaining the efficient and dispositive causes of anger: an act of slight or contempt directed against a person, the superiority of the person who is angered, a lack or defect on the part of the person who does the slighting ( 12.

3). As for anger s effects, Aquinas (perhaps surprisingly) holds that pleasure is necessarily a consequence of anger. Imagining vindication generates some pleasure; achieving vindication produces even more.

Other effects include fervor, the impairment of reason, and taciturnity. While attentive to the negative and destructive effects of immoderate anger, Aquinas emphasizes that anger, like the other passions, is part of human nature and has an appropriate role to play in the human pursuit of good when directed by reason. That Aquinas takes this view of the matter is confirmed by examining the treatment of Christ s anger in the 3a pars ( 12.

4).. 12.1 defining ange none none r as a passion The structure of the consideration of anger initially appears straightforward. According to the Prologue, Aquinas aims to consider anger in itself (Question 46), its causes and remedies (Question 47) and its effects (Question 48).

But a question arises at once. Why does Aquinas say so little about the remedies of anger in Question 47 Did he simply forget to. 12.1 Defining anger as a passion include a Question none none on the topic Or does he suppose that to speak about anger s cause is to address the topic, as if to know the cause of anger is to know its remedy Ram rez suggests this reading: Putavit satis esse videre causas irae ut remedium eius appareat (1973, p. 438). There is a third possibility.

Aquinas may avoid explicit speech about anger s remedy because his primary aim is to exhibit anger as a worthy passion. In itself, anger is natural and promotes the flourishing of the human person.1 When anger ceases to be useful, it becomes a sin in fact, a capital sin and requires correction that goes beyond the palliative care implied by the term remedia.

Question 46 treats anger in itself. After an opening argument that anger is indeed a specific passion, and not merely another name for the irascible power in general (Article 1), Aquinas moves directly to the discussion of anger s object (Article 2). Perhaps because he so clearly connects anger with desire for the good, Aquinas anticipates that some will ask whether it should be located in the concupiscible.

To address this suspicion, and to reinforce the distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible, Aquinas argues that anger s object contains the notion of the arduous (Article 3). The middle section of Question 46 may be read as an apologia pro ira, a defense of anger against a series of accusations.2 Far from being simply irrational, anger requires an act of reason (Article 4).

Anger is not confined to those who are maladjusted, or consumed by hatred. No less than desire itself, anger is natural to the human person (Article 5). It bears a stronger relation to the good than hatred (Article 6) and reflects the.

This is a minority report within the tradition. Stoics and Epicureans, as well as any number of Christian theologians, regard anger as something to be eliminated. Burton (1927) recapitulates the tradition s dominant voice.

Anger is a perturbation and temporary madness ; it will make a Devil of a Saint ; there is no difference betwixt a mad man and an angry man in the time of his fit ; anger, as Lactantius describes it, is a cruel tempest of the mind making his eyes sparkle fire, and stare, teeth gnash in his head, his tongue stutter, his face pale or red, and what more filthy imitation can be of a mad man He continues: angry men are void of reason, inexorable, blind, like beasts & monsters of the time, say and do they know not what, curse, swear, rail, fight and what not. He concludes: Look into our Histories, and you shall meet with no other subject, but what a company of hare-brains have done in their rage! We may do well therefore, to put this in our litany amongst the rest: From all blindness of heart, from pride, vain-glory, and hypocrisy, from envy, hatred, and malice, anger and all such pestiferous perturbations, Good Lord, deliver us! (pp. 233 5).

Note that Burton (and the tradition he recapitulates) is condemning not only the sin of anger (such as Dante describes in Purgatorio, cantos 15 17), but even the passion. As Gondreau (2002) remarks, To pen his remarks on Christ s anger, Aquinas had to contend with the weight of Scripture, Stoic philosophy, and certain patristic authorities (especially Gregory the Great), not to mention common human experience, all of which come down severely on the passion of anger because of its entanglement with sin (p. 439).

See Pieper 1991: Sensuality is good (so much so that Thomas calls unsensuality not merely a defect, but a vitium, a moral deficiency); anger is good; sexuality is good (p. 122)..

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